I. INTRODUCTION
A ubiquitous feature of the United States labor market is the segregation of men and women into different occupations and industries. An early paper by Oaxaca (1973) found that women tend to be in lower paying occupations. Some economists have argued that segregation of jobs into "men's work" and "women's work" is an essential element of labor market discrimination. The crowding hypothesis asserts that barriers that keep women from entering some jobs helps to maintain high wages for men, while forcing women to work for lower wages. Bergman (1986, Chapter 5) for example, stresses the role that segregation plays in reducing pay and advancement of women employees, especially within "internal" labor markets. Bielby and Baron (1984) examines how organizational structures and bureaucratic processes generate and sustain discrimination. Data based on 393 California establishments over the period 1959-79 indicated that segregation increases with establishment size and that establishment size accounts for most of the association between establishment characteristics and job segregation. Furthermore, the study observed that the scope for job segregation lessens with the female share of employment. Neuman and Oaxaca (2001) examines the effects of selection effects of occupational segregation on gender wage differentials among professional workers. Depending on how gender differences in the components on the selectivity terms are interpreted, estimates of gender discrimination can vary widely. Baldwin et al. (2001) identify the effects of occupational segregation on gender wage gaps using a model of hiearchical discrimination in which males have distaste for supervision by female managers. The model predicts that the relative proportion of female workers declines exponentially as one moves up the job ladder. Empirical results from a 1988 CPS sample of workers in the insurance industry support this prediction.
In this paper we take advantage of a unique data set to examine job placement 1 and promotions within a firm. We follow job progression and pay of the firm's retail employees for a period of 10 years, from 1976 to 1986. We find that the pattern of initial job placement and the promotion of female employees leads to a high level of segregation. This segregation also leads to lower pay for female employees.
II. DATA
The data on which this analysis is based come from a large grocery retailer in the United States. Table 1 briefly summarizes some of the characteristics of the firm during the period of our analysis. The firm operated between 55 and 60 retail stores, employing 2200 to 2500 workers in its retail operation. (We do not have data for nonretail employees, such as truck drivers, accountants or janitors.) About 60 percent of these stores were located within a single large metropolitan area. The company closed several stores and opened several new stores during this period.
The firm's employees have changed over the period of analysis. The proportion of employees who were women grew from about 36 percent to about 41 percent. Most employees worked part-time, but this changed rather dramatically over this periodgrowing from 1/2 to 3/4 of all employees. Seniority (and to a lesser extent, age) of the typical employee increased over this period.
In the early 1980's several women initiated a class action lawsuit, alleging discrimination. The company lost the suit in 1984 and eventually reached a settlement in 1986. The settlement required the firm to pay several million dollars in "back pay" and also to initiate affirmative action policies for promotion and job assignment. We show later in this paper that this had a dramatic impact on segregation of women and men across jobs. There are basically four "departments" in each store: meat, produce, grocery, and variety (non-foods). The produce and meat departments each have a manager.
These managers are part of the collective bargaining unit, and they receive a higher wage than other employees. The night crew chief supervises stocking of the store during the night, and also receives a wage premium. The variety department does not have a manager. A few stores have specialized departments, such as a bakery; these employees are lumped together in the "other" category. Courtesy clerks bag and carry groceries for customers. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the job categories shown in Figure 1 Pay scales for clerks are based on seniority level. Scales may also vary slightly by location because the union contracts vary slightly from city to city.
Store level managers typically earn substantially more than other employees. However, the average earnings of the meat department manager are greater than the average earnings of the assistant or relief managers. Other meat department employees also receive relatively high wages compared with other departments.
Most employees in the store work as food clerks. This job includes those who stock shelves and those who operate cash registers. The average wage for food clerks was about $9 per hour at the end of 1982, excluding night shift or overtime premia. This was probably a fairly attractive wage for a job with no special education requirements.
By comparison, the average wage of production workers in manufacturing in the United States for June, 1982 was $8.50. 1 Produce clerks and variety clerks also stock. Produce clerks have the same union wage scale as food clerks, but the variety clerks' scale is much lower. The average wage of variety clerks is $1.75 per hour less than for produce clerks or food clerks.
Courtesy clerks work for near the minimum wage. There is heavy turnover among courtesy clerks, with average seniority of only about one year. Courtesy clerks are about 10 years younger, on average, than food clerks or produce clerks.
III. SEGREGATION AND WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
The distribution of men and women across job titles is reported in Table 3 A convenient way to summarize the level of segregation is to use the dissimilarity index, D. This index is widely attributed to Duncan and Duncan (1955) , who describe some of its properties. The Duncan index is defined as
where p f i is the proportion of all females in job i, and p m i is the proportion of all males in job i. The dissimilarity index is bounded between 0 and 1. Proportional representation of men and women in all job categories would yield a value of 0; completely segregated categories would yield a value of 1. D has a convenient interpretationit is equal to the fraction of women (or men) that would have to change jobs to have 4 equal proportions of men and women in each job. In this case, about 46 percent of women would have to change jobs to achieve proportional representation in all jobs. For other applications of the dissimilarity index to labor market segregation, see Albelda (1986) or Ransom (1990) . Table 4 reports the average characteristics of men and women in the various hourlypaid jobs. In most jobs, the average woman is paid more than the average man, reflecting the typically higher seniority and age of women employees. This is also demonstrated in Table 5 . Table 5 presents results of regression analysis of the natural logarithm of the hourly wage. (Salaried employees are excluded.) The first column shows that women's wages are about 8.5 percent higher than men's, on average. However, this difference is due to the higher seniority and age of women. Column 2 shows that after allowing for these differences, women's wages are actually about 8 percent less than the wages of similarly qualified men.
The third column of Table 5 includes indicators for the job title of the employee.
Once these are included, the male/female wage difference falls to only about 1 percent.
Thus, virtually all sex differences in pay can be explained by the job assignment of the employee. In fact, column IV shows that job title variables explain about 95 percent of all of the variation in wages. Of course, this result cannot be a surprise, since job titles are associated contractually with wage levels. But this analysis does point out that the substantial wage differential observed in column II is the result of segregation -women tend to be placed in low wage jobs relative to their seniority and age.
IV. INTRAFIRM MOBILITY
The relatively disadvantageous job assignments for women can arise from two sources: (1) initial assignment at time of hire, and (2) promotions or other job changes during the employee's tenure at the firm. We will examine both of these issues using various models.
A Markov Model of Mobility
One way to capture intrafirm job movements is with a simple Markov model. Assume that there are K job categories. At any time, t, the proportion of employees in each category can be represented by a 1xK vector, P t , where the ith element is P it .
We are interested in examining both the relationship between P t and P t−1 , as well as the long run value of P t as t becomes very large.
Central to this model is a matrix of transition probabilities. We define a KxK matrix, A, whose ijth element a ij represents the probability of moving from category i in period t − 1 to category j in period t. The ith row contains the probabilities of moving from category i in t − 1 to each of the K categories in period t. Thus, the elements of each row sum to 1: If the job mobility process is stationary, then the following relationship must hold:
In general, one can express P t in terms of an initial period job distribution and the transition matrix by backward recursion:
The long-run distribution of employees across the K categories, P * is independent of the initial distribution, and is defined by
Without loss of generality, we designate the first row of the transition probability matrix A as the transition probabilities corresponding to a new hire being assigned job 6 titles 1 through K: We designate the first column of A as the transition probabilities corresponding to an employment separation (quit, discharge, retirement) from job titles 1 through K. The steady state solution P * 1 (the first element of P * ) may be interpreted as the probability that an employee would leave the company in any given period. Therefore, an employee's expected tenure equals 1=P * 1 : Assuming that the long-run distribution is stationary, the solution for the elements of P * is obtained from
and
In matrix notation the steady state solution to the process may be expressed as
where P * = (P * 1 ; P * 2 ; :::; P *
; b = (1; 0; :::; 0) ; and I K is an identity matrix of dimension K.
In our case, the elements of A are estimated from observed transitions. We use the following estimator:â
where E ijt is the number of employees in category j in year t who were in category i in year t − 1 and N i;t−1 is the number of employees in category i in year t − 1. We have estimated these separately for men and women employees.
Tables 6.a and 6.b present our estimates of the transition matrices based on job titles held by employees as of year-end 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979 transitions observed. The entries in the rows of the table show the disposition of the individuals who held the job title the previous year. For example, the second entry in the first column of Table 6 .a shows that 8.45 percent of male store managers had separated from the company by the end of the next year. This matrix clearly shows the path to management -3.9% of food clerks were promoted to night crew chief each year, while 18.5 percent of crew chiefs were promoted to relief manager, and 19.5 percent of relief managers were promoted to assistant manager, and 9.7 percent of assistant managers were promoted to store manager.
This table also shows why men are absent from some job titles. For example, the first row of the table shows that no men were hired as meat wrappers or variety clerks during the period. Those who held meat wrapper or variety clerk jobs at the beginning of the period left the company at a high rate. The implications of these transition rates can be summarized by looking at the longrun job distribution for men and women. For the 1976-79 period the probabilities of a job separation were 0.218 and 0.197 for men and women, respectively. These probabilities imply an expected tenure of 4.6 years for men and 5.1 years for women.
For the 1983-86 period, the probabilities of a job separation increased to 0.270 and 0.231 for men and women. Correspondingly, the expected tenure fell to 3.7 years for men and to 4.3 years for women. Therefore, the company could expect that women would stay with the firm on average a half-year longer than the men. Conditional upon remaining with the company, the steady state job title distribution is calculated according to P * j = (1 − P * 1 ) ; j = 2; :::; K. Table 7 
Regression Analysis of Mobility
One weakness of the preceding Markov model is that it fails to take account of differences in characteristics of men and women in the various job groups. While this is unlikely to explain much of the gender difference (due to the higher average qualifications of women in our sample), it is interesting to observe the patterns of mobility related to characteristics of individuals. The most interesting group to examine is the food clerks, since that category contains significant numbers of both men and women. This is also a step in the track from hire to store level management positions. 3 We concentrate on two aspects of mobility: (1) separations (voluntary), and (2) promotions into management positions. Table 8 examines separation probabilities, using a probit regression model. We study the group of individuals present as food clerks as of December 31, 1978, and employees have separated if they do not appear as employees in 1982. The first column shows that women are much less likely than men to leave the firm which is consistent with the overall results of our Markov analysis. However, after controlling for age and seniority the difference among Food Clerks is not statistically significant.
This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that women have higher quit propensities. Weiss' (1984) analysis also found lower quit rates for women. He argues that women should have lower quit rates if their opportunities outside the firm are generally inferior to men's. There is a strong correlation between age, seniority, and the separation rate, with the rate falling with age, and falling with seniority for the first 10 years. 4 In Table 9 we analyze the probability of a food clerk being promoted to a store level management position (store manager, assistant manager or relief manager). Again, we analyze employees who held the food clerk job as of December 31, 1978. The dependent variable in the analysis indicates whether the employee held a store level management job in 1982. (This will obviously understate the total number of promotions, since some managers may leave the company and others may be demoted in the intervening period.) Female food clerks are much less likely to be promoted, and the difference is statistically significant. Age and seniority do a poor job of identifying those who will be promoted.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In our analysis of the employment records of a single firm, we have found that there is a high level of segregation of jobs along gender lines. This segregation arises because some entry level jobs are assigned almost exclusively to women (and others to men), and because movements between jobs are much less likely to occur for women than for men. In particular, women were almost totally excluded from department level and store level management positions during the early years of our study. These rates were more favorable for women in the later years of our data, perhaps due to the "shock effect" of a class action lawsuit.
This segregation results in lower pay for women. Our analysis of hourly workers found that in 1982, women's wage rates were about 8 percent lower than men's, after controlling for age and seniority.
5 This difference can be explained almost completely by the different job assignments for men and women. This measure clearly understates the pay gap due to segregation, since the predominantly male, high paying, store management positions are salaried, and thus are not included in this analysis.
Given a finding of gender inequity in the workplace, inquiry would naturally shift to the remedies that a firm or court of law should consider. In Oaxaca and Ransom (2000) several within-firm equity salary adjustment algorithms are developed. These algorithms are designed to satisfy various constraints such as total disbursement of the originally estimated aggregate salary inequity, invariance of the salaries of male workers with respect to a salary adjustment mechanism, the avoidance of salary reductions for women stemming from an adjustment mechanism, and positive lower bound constraints on salary adjustments for women. Simulations were run in which these salary adjustment algorithms were applied to a 1986 data set from the same company represented in the present study. Depending on which constraints are satisfied, the distribution of equity salary adjustments can be quite different. However, these algorithms beg the question of how they should be implemented. This is an important question in the light of this paper's findings that gender differences in job titles can be a major, if not the sole, reason for gender salary inequity. Pure salary adjustments without a program for short-term job reassignments and long-term equity in promotion and hiring is tantamount to a comparable worth solution. A solution 11 along these lines most likely would distort the occupational wage structure.
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1. Source, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982-83 (103rd edition), Table   665 .
2. Note that the fact that women crew chiefs present in one year always show up in the same job the next year presents a problem for our long-run analysis. We have assumed that no women will have the job title.
3. Positions such as variety clerk and meat wrapper show almost no mobility, so they do not present an interesting case for regression analysis.
4. Using a different functional form, we found that separation rates were about the same for those above about 25 years of age. Of course, separation rates among the youngest workers are extremely high.
5. Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) reports wage decompositions based on a 1986 sample from the same firm. Separate (log) earnings equations were estimated for males and females. Depending on the type of decomposition used, the unexplained earnings gap ranged from 28.8 percent to 33.1 percent in favor of men after accounting for age and seniority. Some of the unexplained gap may have resulted from different labor supply choices, but much had to do with job as- 
